Episode Transcript
Speaker 1 00:00:04 This is Dick Flax welcoming you back to talking strategy, making history. And I'm excited because my partner in crime here, DCA Lamore Hall, he's recently made a trip to Sweden where he is spent quite a bit of time participating in the election campaign. And that's very important for our conversation here in this continuing series about the troubles and vicissitudes of socialism and social democracy. Because, uh, in Sweden, the result of that election was, uh, the taking of the lead with right wing, uh, right wing coalition. And then in Italy, shortly after a right wing coalition took power led by a woman who is really a descendant of the fascist movement in, in Italy, as we are speaking this very moment, Brazilian polls are going to close, and the election results there very fraught election with a fascist, semi dictator challenge by a, uh, charismatic left wing leader. What the results will be just seems to be already a kind of military interference with the elections. I've just heard these are all great troubles for the future of electoral politics in the, uh, so-called democratic world. And, uh, it's, you know, but I think the good news for us right here in our conversation, DECA, is that you've come back from some of that and you are a keen observer to my point of view, uh, of all of this. So, uh, you know, what did happen in Sweden electorally?
Speaker 2 00:01:56 Well, uh, so Sweden just, uh, completed its, uh, national election, and they, they have a, an election for their national parliament at the same time as elections in regions and cities. So at the most local level as well, all in one go. And, uh, the results were, well, really quite catastrophic, frankly. Uh, a very small stop me if you've heard this one before, <laugh> from Amer the American experience and others, it's actually a very small shift in voters, like between parties. Uh, but the shift that happened, uh, was, uh, dominated by, uh, a historic, uh, jump in support for a far right party. A party with Nazi roots, a a party founded by explicit, uh, you know, neo-Nazi activists. And, uh, you know, they are now the second largest party in parliament, the largest party among the conservative block of parties, uh, and therefore very much in the driver's seat of policy in a direct way, which they hadn't, uh, been for, uh, been in the past.
Speaker 2 00:03:12 And then the other sort of net, uh, takeaway is that, uh, enough voters switched from parties committed to supporting a social democratic government to parties that wanted, uh, to support one of the, the opposition parties. So the, the, the incumbent social democratic government, uh, lost its, its majority lost its mandate. And so, um, uh, it are no longer in power in opposition. So it was a, a change of blocks, and then within the right wing block, the emergence of the most, uh, viciously nationalist, uh, racist xenophobic, and, and, and really just across the board traditionalist party, uh, uh, in Swedish politics. And, and, and one of the most sort of out outrageously, uh, obviously tied to the, the far right, uh, that we see anywhere in Europe. Um, so it was a, a real blow for, for Swedish democracy for sure.
Speaker 1 00:04:13 And that party, which is the Democratic Party, that's
Speaker 2 00:04:16 The name of the, no, the Sweden Democrats, Sweden. So as a, yeah, as a sort of counter, a sort of, you could say rhetorical counter to the traditional, uh, party of governance in Sweden, which is the social Democrats, you know? So replacing, you can see it explicitly in replacing social with Sweden. Sweden is to say, you know, that they are putting swedishness and the nation, uh, ahead of any kind of universalist value.
Speaker 1 00:04:44 And historically, that's a party, even the right wing, other conservative parties shunned, right. They would not, uh, want them in the government
Speaker 2 00:04:51 In the past. That's right. And that's a really very important thing, uh, to, to watch, to be watching throughout Europe, which is well throughout the world, I should say. But, um, uh, the, this, this trend is especially concentrated in Europe, you know, not for nothing, the, the, the cradle of fascism to begin with. Um, but it's, uh, you know, that a party will emerge or, uh, in some cases like extend directly from a defeated, a defeated fascist party from World War ii, which is the case in Italy. Um, the party that, uh, is now is now governing Italy, uh, is the, you know, has the Prime Minister's seat, uh, is is a party that was founded by, you know, by fascists who lost the war, lost World War ii, lost the internal struggle in Italy, and were like, well, we need a new party, let's found one.
Speaker 2 00:05:39 And I'm not gonna try to, you know, go through all of their name changes, splits, and mergers, but there's a direct line of, of, of, uh, organizational heritage from that point to, uh, Maloney's party, the brothers of Italy that are, are now in power. Um, but all, all over Europe, there was, after World War ii, a set of sometimes formal and sometimes informal agreements between parties of the center left, the center right, et cetera, that they wouldn't cooperate with parties that were at the, at either extreme. I mean, there were certain kinds of left wink parties too, that were suspect for kind of the state building centrist parties. Um, and that differs from country to country. But, you know, certainly after 89 and the fall of the Soviet Union, when most of the far left parties sort of re had to rethink about their relationship to democracy, and, uh, if they hadn't already sort of accepted the terms of, uh, of, you know, liberal democracy and participation and so forth, um, the, it, it's been parties of the right that were seen as a threat to the constitutional order or good sense, or keeping racism out of politics or whatever the norm was.
Speaker 2 00:07:00 And in, in country after country, those norms that, um, cordone sanitaire, as they say, that wall keeping those parties out of participation and government ha has been whittled away. And, uh, we saw that, you know, maybe the first, uh, domino to fall was in Denmark, um, uh, or probably maybe Austria even before that. But, you know, uh, whereas, you know, when, if you go back 20 years or more, uh, you know, a country could be sanctioned as Austria was, if a, you know, party far right, xenophobic, racist party, um, got too close to power. And nowadays it's just like it's business as usual. Um, yeah. Uh, and so, so, so in Sweden, uh, this, you know, the Sweden Democrats have gone over the last, say, decade from being a party that no one would negotiate with, and no one would talk to, to a party that now is able to kind of dictate policy terms to the government and exchange for votes, which is many people would say, laying the groundwork for next time, uh, if they also have a successful election, that they would, you know, be in government, have ministers even be the prime minister of Sweden.
Speaker 1 00:08:15 So before we get into the, uh, details of the why and what, what the meaning of all this is, just tell us, uh, what was your opportunity about why were you there, uh, in Sweden for
Speaker 2 00:08:28 Yeah, well, so my, my day job, so to speak, is working as a, a consultant organi organizing campaign, uh, consultant, uh, for, uh, political parties and unions, mostly abroad. And for the last six years or so, I've been working for the, uh, social Democratic party of Stockholm. So the, the, the regional party organization for the city, uh, of Stockholm. And, uh, so you know, very much about getting prepared for the last, the last two elections now that, um, I've been working with them, but also organizing the, the, the, the, the membership, uh, building leadership, thinking about new ways of engaging communities, you know, experimenting with community organizing strategies, um, developed here in the United States, things like that. So, um, it's very much an inside view, you could say of, um, the way that at least one part of that party, uh, has been, uh, you know, coping with dealing with a, a, a rapidly changing political reality.
Speaker 1 00:09:35 So how do we get to the heart of why this, uh, shift is happening and who, who in the electorate, what parts of the electorate are, are most shifting in, in toward the right, uh, in this, in this period?
Speaker 2 00:09:50 So,
Speaker 2 00:09:52 I'm sure this is gonna come as a shock to all of the Americans listening, um, but the, the group that is really leading the, the shift to the right all over Europe, uh, demographically are white men. Um, we ha it's, uh, yeah, very bizarre, uh, totally counter to global trends and historical trends. Uh, no, I, I mean, I joke, but it's, it's really true that, uh, although there are cultural differences, policy differences, historical and, and certainly institutional, very different kinds of institutions at play, um, the, the overall story is the same everywhere. And, you know, this is what we talked about a lot last season, uh, in the context of the United States and the Bernie campaign, and the possibilities and limitations of Bernie's arguments and so forth, is that the, the general story of, uh, capitalist countries is that there was a part of the working class that also were the majority ethnically, racially in various countries, um, that could be relied on to vote for progressive parties, left and center, left parties, those parties, you know, drove the building of the welfare state and the institutional power of unions, uh, et cetera.
Speaker 2 00:11:12 And all of that in various countries starts to, a, across the world in different speeds, starts to fall apart in the 1970s. Um, and different groups of that, uh, that working class base for the left start to drift away or be tempted by other politics. It's happened in different speeds in different places, different flavors in different places. But one through line is that issues of xenophobia, of cultural loss, of, uh, you know, reaction to social change, all of those things seem to be, uh, part of that exodus of white working class voters and parts of the middle class too, um, from the left to the right. So that, that's one of the stories that's going on in Sweden over the last 20 years. There's been voters in the countryside, in small cities, which is where, uh, Sweden's extremely robust and very impressive industrial base industrial infrastructure is.
Speaker 2 00:12:15 It's, it's out in small towns and small cities in, in the outer ring of, of some of the major metropolises. And the voters in those areas have been shifting, uh, not just to the Sween Democrats, but also to the more mainstream conservatives, uh, pretty steadily for decades. Um, and the appeal of the, the sort of extra appeal of the Sweden Democrats and why they, they steal voters or have been taking voters not just from the left mind you, but like also from other right wing or centrist parties, um, is that they have a very simple, clear, uh, argument and narrative that problems in Sweden, uh, issues, uh, that make people scared or insecure or worried are tied to, uh, immigration are tied to, uh, having a more diverse society racially and culturally and, uh, ethnically. And that going back to a time in which Sweden was, uh, uh, you know, close to, uh, homogenous when it came to race and ethnicity, though it never was, it's never been homogenous, truly. Um, but, but to harken back to that time, uh, both in terms of policy and rhetoric, so like, how, how did they do so well? They, they ran on make Sweden great again, um, in the same way that the national front in, in France has been, you know, talking about making France great again, um, now for 40 years,
Speaker 1 00:13:51 Well, uh, making Sweden great again. But, but there's several strands to what I'm hearing from you about this. One is that the source of problems is, are the immigrants or the aliens who've entered the society. So I take that to mean, uh, crime and, um, uh, you know, the, the, that kind of perennial right wing issue that these people are bringing not only alien culture, but alien behavior that is threatening and dangerous, even disease, uh, all kinds of, um, contamination, which is, you know, this is a foundation of racism itself, uh, that kind of thinking. Absolutely. Um, and then there's this nationalist appeal, which may be combined with the first, but maybe it's a, also a separate kind of appeal to certain parts of the, of the population. Um, is there really a, um, sweet Sweden had an pretty open policy with respect to welcoming the social democratic government has had that policy, right? And that makes them vulnerable until, huh,
Speaker 2 00:15:05 Until recently. And then
Speaker 1 00:15:07 This is, so tell us about, yeah. About the story of immigration itself in Sweden.
Speaker 2 00:15:12 Yeah. And I, I, we should post, uh, there's a couple of really great, uh, pieces. Um, one of which, uh, uh, in the Boston Review recently by, uh, a Swedish sociologist, uh, and advocate, uh, anti-racist advocate, um, named Tobias Huett. Uh, we should put that when we post this article that'll go into these numbers more accurately than I'm about to spin off the top of my head. But there was, so Sweden has, in a very short amount of time in just a couple of decades, gone from a country with very, very little, uh, diversity in terms of background and a whole range of identities, you could say, you know, from religion to skin color, uh, to a, a very diverse society, uh, uh, very quickly, you know, within the memory of, of voters, uh, which is significant, right? So, like, if you think about dynamics in a town or city or state in the United States, that becomes, which we see all the time, we've, this is the history of our country, right?
Speaker 2 00:16:13 Is like a region or a city will become diverse, uh, fairly quickly. And there is a nativist response. There's problems with integration. There's, there's is there's politics that happens as a result of that, of course. So that's what's happening in Sweden is, um, that the, you have this social, this, this fairly big social change happening. It happens at the same time that, uh, all, you know, along with so many other countries, uh, in the, the, the eighties and nineties, uh, there's, you know, a hollowing out of some of the, uh, welfare state protections and programs, um, uh, Swedish, the Swedish industrial sector is hit by, uh, globalization and competition, um, from around the world, just like the working class or the industrial working class everywhere. So, at the same time that there are these social, these challenges, economic challenges and policy shifts coming from the social Democrats, Sweden, you know, becomes the, the, I think the most diverse, uh, country in, in Europe.
Speaker 2 00:17:27 Uh, again, depending on how you define those things. Um, so the, and you know, the most of that, uh, in migration, most of it has been refugees, different waves of refugees. Um, Sweden has never had a, a large or an open immigration policy, so to speak, the way that a country like the US does, that there's, you know, people can just move here cuz they wanna move here and work. That's actually always been extremely difficult to do to Sweden. Um, yeah, unless you marry someone or something. Uh, but the, the way that large groups of people, uh, have moved there has been, you know, in response to a, some kind of global crisis. So you had lots of people moving from the Balkans, uh, in the, the eighties and nineties in response to the, the wars and crises there. And most recently, uh, a large population of folks from, uh, from, from places in Africa, uh, that have been, you know, devastated by war and, uh, you know, uh, civil war conflict, uh, and economic, uh, crises.
Speaker 2 00:18:39 So, um, and in comparison to other countries in Europe, uh, especially under social democratic governments, Sweden has been relatively, uh, generous with itch. Its, uh, refugee and asylum policy. Um, don't want to give it too much credit. Like everybody in the world, all the country rich countries in the world need to do better. Um, but, you know, even up into the refugee crisis of 2015, Sweden was a standout while other countries were, you know, building walls and refusing entry. Um, you know, a lot of people who, uh, were seeking new places to live in 2015 during that crisis ended up in Sweden. Um, but that was, you know, to not to monologue for too long. But 2015 can't be exaggerated as the real inflection point where the social Democrats shifted policy to become much more restrictive of who could come to Sweden when you could, uh, for example, reunify families, uh, how easy it was to be kicked out. Um, a whole range of policy reversals, uh, uh, were were developed by the, by the party in government, uh, in 2015. And
Speaker 1 00:19:58 That has proven because of the rise, because of the rise of the Sweden Democrats and, and the, and the right wing, uh, attack on immigration. Is that what that's,
Speaker 2 00:20:08 Yes. I mean, uh, if that wasn't happening, uh, no doubt the history would've been different. But, um, you know, but the, the, you know, I think Americans, a lot of Americans, you know, don't remember what that, um, that moment was or, uh, for, yeah, for Europe and for, for European politics, for European society. But, you know, the, just thousands and thousands of people crossing, uh, borders every minute, <laugh>, um, and a need to, to house and protect and feed them, um, coupled with a, a, this is an open question of like, like, how do you process them fairly? What do you do with them, et cetera. And so you look, look across the map of Europe and look at what happened politically as a result of that. And you have a couple of standout heroes like, uh, an Angela Merkel who, you know, I guess listened to the Christian part of Christian democracy and stood against her own right wing to be, again, relatively a good actor in terms of taking care of these people.
Speaker 2 00:21:13 Um, uh, but then you have like, you know, Italy, which went hard, right? Elected what we thought would be the most right wing government possible in Italy, but hey, Italy's always like <laugh>, you know, hold my grandpapa and, uh, let's go for it. So the, uh, you know, but like they had, uh, they were turning away boats. They were, you know, not caring about, uh, people ending up dead, uh, trying to cross, um, the Mediterranean, uh, and are, you know, are prosecuting a mayor for welcoming refugees. I mean, just really, it broke a lot of people's minds as the kids would say, 2015. And it, in a sense, broke the social democratic party of Sweden's mind. Uh, I would say from that point, yeah, go ahead.
Speaker 1 00:21:58 Did the leadership in the, in the social democratic party think that by becoming more, uh, restricted with respect immigration, they would blunt the right wing growth?
Speaker 2 00:22:10 Yes, yes. And I mean, and, and more fundamentally, yeah.
Speaker 1 00:22:13 And that didn't work.
Speaker 2 00:22:16 Um, it did not work <laugh>, it did not work. Um, it was about blunting the growth of the right wing. Uh, it was a, you know, you, you would hear, and you still do hear a lot the same kind of talk that, um, you know, uh, old, older, old fogies like us, remember from the nineties in the United States with Clintonites saying things like, well, if we come out for welfare reform, it takes welfare as a weapon away from the right. Like, they can't attack us anymore on it, um, turned out to also not work, not really be true though. But the one thing, you know, I have to be a bit agnostic about or, or humble about, is that it is always possible and always true, that had they not done that, it would've been worse, Uhhuh, <affirmative>, or they would've lost more votes. And, and then, and the point that, uh, I think that we get here in the US a lot, but people need to start thinking about in terms of European politics as well, even though they have a multi-party system, you know, which is that a party like the social Democrats are trying to get their mandate, their vote block, their voted plurality.
Speaker 2 00:23:25 But no, nobody, nobody's realistically thinking they can get over 50%, uh, as a single party at this point in history. Um, uh, part of the politics is just too stratified. But, you know, if they want to get high thirties into 40% and be a dominant, dominant party the way that they have been for most of the last century, um, they, you know, they need to be able to get votes from white working class voters in small towns and from very pro-immigration, pro multicultural, anti-racist urban voters. Um, and, you know, some of the kids that are worried about, you know, climate change and the world ending, and the, from the, uh, immigrant populations and, and minority communities that by the way, have also become an incredibly important part of, like, mathematically electorally part of any progressive, uh, majority base or progressive party, uh, in Sweden or in Europe.
Speaker 2 00:24:32 So I guess what I'm saying is the, they, yes, they may have stopped the bleeding on one part of their ba from one part of their base by tacking to the right on immigration, on migration on the border, um, and by the way, and then following that up with attack to the right on crime, uh, which we should talk about in its sort of own space. But, um, I can't say that it couldn't, it wouldn't, you know, it's possible that it would've been worse in some ways if they hadn't done that, but it, you know, didn't mobilize their urban base, and it didn't stop the fascists from getting more votes. So, um, certainly it was oversold as a strategy.
Speaker 1 00:25:19 So, backtracking a little in what you said in passing, I want to focus in on this, this comment you made the hollowing out of the welfare state that was going on, not because of immigration, but it's a parallel development. So what, what did you mean by the hollowing out of the welfare state? So, sweet. Let me just say, yeah, Sweden is to, to us Americans like the epitome of the welfare state, um, and whether true or not, but, but to a great extent, true. So what's, why, what was going on with Halloween? Where, where was the Halloween happening and why?
Speaker 2 00:25:57 Well, so, you know, Sweden's specialness, or, you know, what, uh, characterizes its, uh, economic policy and approach is not just a strong welfare state, but also, uh, uh, several other institutions and institutional arrangements that, you know, are, uh, yeah, our, or hallmarks of what social democrats in the Nordic region would do if they, when they had power. So you find similar things in Denmark, in Norway, uh, in Finland, much, much less extent in Iceland. But the, you know, it is yes, a strong welfare state, meaning a a lot of social goods that are provided publicly, um, that you get, as you know, what an, a Republican in America would call an entitlement, um, that you get by virtue of citizenship or residency, um, and you, and that you, you pay into, uh, as do the employers. Um, but it's also, um, a, a wage setting, a wage and working condition setting mechanism that's done largely at the national level, negotiated by, uh, conglomerate of employers and a conglomerate of trade unions, um, such that Sweden doesn't have a legal minimum wage, nor any laws or rules anywhere that you have to join a union.
Speaker 2 00:27:29 But built into the system is a, yeah, again, this, this co determination in which labor and capital cut a deal, um, cut continuous deals, um, uh, and which is a, you know, has allowed for economic planning and policy making that's like to uplift whole classes, whole regions, whole groups of people, and not just like, Hey, I happen to be in the union pickle maker, so I got, you know, 5 cents more an hour than the non-union pickle maker, which is like how it works here. Um, and then the, the other pillar, you know, is a set of social movement institutions that like you could directly participate in and get things out of education, um, uh, you know, vacation opportunities, uh, uh, up building, you know, is the sort of word that's used in Swedish that's, you know, it's kind of education, but, uh, it's hard to translate, but where like working people and poor people could go and be part of these movement organizations, these movement institutions, and really get something out of it.
Speaker 2 00:28:32 And so, um, and, and also take that collective bargaining ethos into all these other spheres of life that would blow, uh, uh, an Anglo American sort of Anglo-Saxon, uh, uh, approach to social life, uh, outta the water. Because, you know, you, you vote for parties, uh, to run the, you know, to be the deacons of the Swedish church, and you can, you know, belong to a nationwide tenants union that negotiates rents, you know, regionally and nationally. Um, not, you don't, you're not just like me and my landlord. So that, that's what I'd say. And, and I, I guess what I'd say is starting in the seventies, because of all of the pressures of globalization, the oil crisis, all the things that, you know, forced this dynamic in every rich country, um, there was a kind of peak of generosity of the welfare state, and it started to be cut little places, more means tested, um, less, yeah, less generous, less open, less accessible things that were owned by the state were privatized.
Speaker 2 00:29:44 Um, the amount of jobs that were covered by these large collective bargaining agreements start to, you know, the percentage of it share of it starts to be diminished. More and more jobs are in like, you know, shadowy parts of the service sector or big American corporations that have a different idea of how to work with unions. So, you know, without going too far into the weeds, I I, I think that, you know, the, the neoliberal turn, as people talk, talk about it hit Sweden way less harshly than it did in many other countries. Um, you know, uh, and, and there was nothing like a Thatcher, um, but there was like a long slow Tony Blair, you could say
Speaker 1 00:30:27 Uhhuh <affirmative>, and, and it was the social democrats that, that, uh, developed these, this, uh, more, more austere policy, right? Yeah. It was mm-hmm. <affirmative>, was there, uh, how much conflict over those, uh, cutbacks or reductions in, in, in the scope of the welfare state, how much of that was resisted and, and battled over? Or was it
Speaker 2 00:30:51 Basically, yeah, it was, and sometimes though you could see that as like, or it manifests as it battled between the unions and the party, or within the party between factions. Um, but one thing to know kind of political culturally about the social Democrats, uh, well, social democratic parties, I think across the board, um, but Sweden is a, is a, you know, sort of classic example for political scientists, is that the party is very strong and very, uh, unity oriented <laugh>, to put it, um, mildly right? Um, there,
Speaker 2 00:31:30 There are ways in which it's more democratic and deliberative than, uh, anything that we have in terms of major parties in the us, uh, which is one of the reasons I really enjoy working in it and around it. Um, but also, you know, when it, when a, when a decision is made, there's very strong pressures, very strong wins that try to, you know, enforce those decisions. Um, it's, uh, and then also, you know, just like anywhere else as your electoral base shrinks in a sense, um, and even if you're like, you're not sure whether your strategy is responsible for it or not, you become even less and less, uh, you are more and more risk averse, less and less sort of experimental, more and more pragmatic, um, to hold onto that shrinking base, right? Um, and that's been happening. Um, you know, I, we could talk for, for hours, it's like a whole, uh, separate debate, like, why did this party move politically?
Speaker 2 00:32:34 How far did it move? Uh, et cetera. But yes, there was always debate, always push back. And the other thing is like, there's other parties in Sweden that voters, you know, disenfranchised, disenchanted voters can move to. So, you know, it's not for nothing that the green party emerges as a force to sort of fill in a gap. Um, there has always been a political party to the left of the social Democrats in Sweden. It was the Communist Party. It also went through this Democratic transition is now the left party. There's still some communists in it, whatever. But, you know, it's, it's, it's a party that sees itself as a democratic socialist alternative on the left of the social Democrats. So those parties also play a role in sort of pushing the party, absorbing voters that are unhappy about things, et cetera.
Speaker 1 00:33:23 But then in the end, uh, because no party as a majority, the social Democrats are in coalition with some of those left wing oriented parties as well. So, um, it's an interesting in dynamic in itself. But, so the small town, white male working class defection from social Democrats, um, was that based on objectively declining opportunity and and security for, for those people? Is that, what was that based on economic decline and, and, uh, living standard decline or threat?
Speaker 2 00:34:03 Hmm. So, so I think that it's like, just like in the United States and elsewhere, that has become an over-determined like, question or, or, uh, outcome <laugh>, uh, I, I don't think you can separate the subjective from the objective. I don't think that, um, uh, the, I, I i I, from everything that I've read, that's like in the minds of Trump voters, or let's look at Trump voters incomes, or let's look at the, you know, the, the support for the national front in France and look, try to locate their voters by class. You, you end up with a lot of contradictory claims about to answer that question. Um, they, because people can perceive that they're in decline, but actually like, be okay in terms of income. Uh, but obviously as we've learned from elections here, like if you go to those people and say, but look at your, you at your paycheck, it's 2% more and try to like, prove to them that everything's okay, it doesn't really work there.
Speaker 2 00:35:12 There's some, if there's something psychological going on. Um, so because yes, uh, there have been parts of the working class in Sweden are like the traditional working class in Sweden that have taken hits for sure. Absolutely. Um, now the new working class in Sweden, the more precarious folks, the folks that are, whose communities are chronically underemployed, uh, et you know, groups of young workers that have been locked out of the, the labor market. There's lots of groups of workers in Sweden that are much less well off than say, industrial workers. Um, but you know, that's not how people think. So mm-hmm. <affirmative> it. So yes, there's, there was a decline, but also, also there was people for the first time in post-war Sweden coming out and making a political appeal to them based on identity, racism, prejudice, et cetera. And it's proven to be very powerful and very persuasive.
Speaker 1 00:36:14 So, but on that point, so my understanding limit, and that's what I, one of the reasons I really wanted to get into this conversation is this understanding at all true the, the Sweden Democrats SA claim to be supporting the, the pillars of the welfare state. That their argument is that immigration undermines the mm-hmm. <affirmative>, the Swedish, uh, Sweden first character of the welfare state, that, that it's diluting all these poorer people are coming in. Uh, the state budget can't manage this. We wanna restrict immigration to keep the Swedish way of social democracy. I bring this up because that's very different from the say US or British situation where the conservatives are against the very, uh, you know, welfare state foundations. That's presumably people rely on working, people rely on even in these countries. Uh, and, uh, uh, so it looks like, you know, what's the matter with Kansas working people in state like Kansas voting against their interests because they're voting for the right, but in, I'm wondering if, how, how does that work out in Sweden in terms of mm-hmm.
Speaker 2 00:37:35 <affirmative>? Um, it's, it's a great question and I, I think it's really important to avoid, you know, trying to reduce political behavior to, you know, like one to like an abstraction, like left and right on the, on the economy or like, et cetera. Like people are making, it turns out like they're not as partisan, rational, or loyal as we might have thought. <laugh> some, some groups of voters. And, um, and they're, they're like up for grabs. There's, and uh, like, uh, irritable, uh, you know, uh, there's a whole bunch of books. There's a, a couple books have come out in Sweden talk, like with similar titles, um, as well as here in the US of just trying to diagnose, uh, kind of mood among parts of the electorate of just being like mad. Um, and it's hard to exactly pin down why, um, because their, their, their solutions or the, the politicians or the parties that they vote for as solutions are all over the map and not very coherent, et cetera.
Speaker 2 00:38:43 So it's the same for some Swedish voters that, you know, if you sit down and talk to them, there are lots of things about the welfare state that are very popular and they like, and they want to keep. Um, and people will come to them with various arguments about those things. Either we should cut taxes to the rich because then somehow they'll employ more people and pay more taxes. And then that will shore up that welfare state, that thing you like about the welfare state or kick out the immigrants cuz they're stealing it from you or a social democratic one. Like we should tax wealthier people more so we can put more money into it, right? Um, and the fact is like American voters, just like Swedish voters can come up with or be attracted to really weird arguments about that, right? You remember, keep the government out of my Medicare, right? And like the super incoherent weirdness that was the Tea party. Um, so the Sweden democrats have a sort of similar thing that they're populist. So they're, if something in the welfare state is popular, they're for it for sure, but they'll, how they'll put it contextualize their support for it in some kind of ethnonationalist way are getting back to the, their main theme of making a more ethnically, racially pure Sweden again. So, um, the,
Speaker 2 00:40:06 So yes, they're different than the moderates, the, the sort of traditional conservative party and the, and the Christian Democrats and so forth in that sense that they are a little, they can be more heterodox about economic policy that they support or not. And remember that's kind of what we thought was gonna be true with Trump. Um, and when he, he first ran right there was like, there were even kind of dumb leftists that were like, ah, but this guy, like he'll, he, he, he could be end up being for Medicare for all because one time he said he liked Medicare or something, you know? Right, right. And, and that's true of the Sweden Democrats. But, but when Trump got in, in order to get anything done, he had to work with the Republicans who were far more disciplined and, you know, anti-government and neoliberal. So the only thing he really accomplished was the tax cuts.
Speaker 2 00:40:53 And the same with the Sweden Democrats that, you know, they may be the biggest party on the right, but they still need the other parties of the right to get things done. And so they've, we, we've already seen them kind of capitulate on questions of where they're kind of populist and you could say leftish by accident or, you know, broken clock kind of thing. And they're happy to like, get rid of it and abandon it to stay in power and so forth. So, you know, God help you if you're a worker and you're relying on fascists making worker sounds, you know, to protect your rights. If it's one thing we've learned about that part of the right is sure they're not capitalist in the same way that the neoliberal right is. Um, and so sometimes they'll do stuff to like put more money in a working man's pocket, but only, only some of the working men, not only working men <laugh>. So fuck it.
Speaker 1 00:41:49 So, uh, just to continue this thread, so I guess what I'm trying to construct is a story that says some of the support for the fascistic parties comes from people who, who are disgusted with or angry at the traditional party that was their party, the social democratic party or the Labor Party in England, or left party in, in a left party, say in Italy. Those parties have betrayed them. This is, you know, one way to look at it from their point of, from the point of view, this kind of voter, um, we can we, but here's this populist party that seems to be for us not only in in, in, in, in the benefits side, but in the identity side. Uh, and we might as well give them a try. And, and fascism roots are in, you know, Mussolini had been a socialist before it became a fascist.
Speaker 1 00:42:50 The, the Nazi party, it's was the National Socialist Party. Uh, they felt they had to, you know, use that, those words in order to, uh, get, get a, a handle on, on a working class base that they, that would've historically been against them. Not that they, you know, they, that wasn't what they were delivering. But, uh, so, so I, I mean, I guess I'm looking for where are the, where's the achilles heel of the fascist parties? And one of them seems to be, uh, working class base may be, uh, may be persuadable because these parties are really aligned with, uh, class interests that these workers can come to see are not their interests.
Speaker 2 00:43:42 Uh, so no, I don't think so. Like I don't, yeah, cuz the, we don't know two things. One is that the, the fascist part of the fascist appeal, the racist part, the sexist part, the nationalist part, the cruel part, the othering, all of that stuff is really powerful and it works and people like it. Sure, yeah. Yeah. And that's like the thing that I think the left just always, like, we just never want to admit <laugh>, you know, we always want to have a story where it's like, ah, they were duped if, if, if, if our economic line was better, we'd get 'em back. Now, don't get me wrong. Like, I want our economic line to be better. The part of the, what's the matter with Kansas argument or, you know, the Bernie argument, all of that stuff that I agree with is having good economic policies that are good for workers makes it easier to pull people back, makes it easier to get the, those voters back.
Speaker 2 00:44:35 And it's the right thing to do. And there's like a million reasons to do it. Um, but one of those is not, then we get the workers back because it's really, I think if you look historically it's been, it was more that there was a very lucky period of time in which, uh, you know, ra these kind of racist arguments and so forth, like didn't work so much or they weren't being made or there was an agreement not to make them, et cetera, that we were able to have some interracial solidarity and make progress. And so, but it's like the, and you know, I don't have to tell you, you were right there, you're a veteran of like, that still took a shit load of work Sure. To pull any kind of multiracial coalition together to do progress. So the point is, the norm is that vo that workers working, people choose between various appeals and worldviews, and they will go so far as to vote for someone who's like, I'm gonna shut down your school and privatize your job, but I will get rid of the immigrants.
Speaker 2 00:45:43 They like that so much, they'll do that. And more importantly, or sort of subtly, right? Like people can begin to create a worldview in which, you know, uh, a right wing economic approach meshes with a right wing social argument or race argument, right? Like it's really important to all to, for, to, to always remember the political work that it took for, to really make the coalition of southern white voters and northern white voters, you know, together as the silent majority and being mad at the blacks and the hippies and so forth, because they had very different like understandings of like what kind of economic policy was good for them, Uhhuh <affirmative>. Um, and it took, it took work for groups to be like, to, to figure out in America how to make an argument against the welfare state, against unions, against big government. That was also a racist argument and appeal to white, uh, you know, fears and so forth. Like merging those things also took work that that process will happen and is happening in Sweden.
Speaker 1 00:46:55 Okay. So, um, one, one conclusion from what you're, you're saying that that is good political psychology in my mind, um, is that the political choices people make at the polls in the electoral process, uh, and the is, is, uh, shaped by identity and peop is the shaped by the fact that people, voters have multiple identities. That's right. And voting is a collective act, not just an individual decision. And, and, uh, the collectivities you identify with, they can be class, they can be sexuality, they can be gender, they can be, uh, race, ethnicity, religion, all of those are at play. And in this country we see that all the time because we don't have strong class politics, uh, in, in our history the way Sweden did. So, um, so, but that's coming into play in all these European countries that, those contradictory identities, uh, and, and, uh, okay. So, uh, we can't count on simply class appeals to unify majoritarian, uh, social democratic type base, uh, for, for the future.
Speaker 2 00:48:16 And I think that's the lesson for every, the hard lesson for everybody.
Speaker 1 00:48:20 So, so you, you have the benefit, I think, I'm guessing your Swedish comrades see you as someone with a particular message. You're coming from the usa uh, which oddly enough has experienced that they, they need to hear about perhaps you, your own, uh, your own. So what are you, what is your advice to the, to the people in the social democratic world of Sweden that you've been giving about how to, how to overcome this, how to move forward, uh, from here?
Speaker 2 00:48:54 Yeah. Well it's, that's it also an interesting question. I mean, my advice is that very quickly the Swedish left, I mean, I mean the social democratic party, the trade unions, also the left party and various, you know, social movement, uh, formations and networks, you know, have to learn, uh, how to integrate an anti-racist analysis and practice and, uh, culture, um, into all the rest of the work that they're doing, and do it very, very quickly. Um, it's a sort of catch up that needs to happen. Uh, it is a criticism that I would make and I, you know, I've never shied away from, and, um, you know, both sort of morality and mental health dictate that the party has a, and the, and the unions and all of vitals have a long way to go, both in terms of an internal culture that is anti-racist as well as mainstreaming that analysis and way of thinking and critique into all of their policies.
Speaker 2 00:50:05 You know, if you read the, the, the program for the, the party, um, which is always more interesting reading than like our party platforms because you kind of more directly shapes actual policy and law and legislation. Um, but it's, it's a lot better than it ever has been at integrating feminism and an understanding of the way the gender plays a role in the economy and, uh, uh, you know, civil society and crime prevention and so forth. Um, you, you know, so that it, it's there throughout the document, not just as like a paragraph that we don't like sexism, which is what it was, you know, uh, in the eighties, <laugh>. So, but like racism is just, you know, it's like they, they're, they don't like it. They think racism is bad, not very clear about what it is, um, or how to fight it. And one of the consequences of that is that when it comes time to talk about the, the social problems and the challenges, and right now a, a, a real, um, safety crisis, public safety crisis in immigrant communities in the, what the, you know, they, they consider suburbs or sort of out outlying areas in which, uh, people of color, people of non Swedish backgrounds, uh, immigrant families are concentrated.
Speaker 2 00:51:28 Like they don't know what to do about their existence, really, about how to think about that, how to think about those communities because talking about identity and talking about race and talking about difference is so uncomfortable, <laugh> and, uh, uh, they're just un not practiced at it. Um, I mean, that's the like, generous part of it. The ungenerous and critical and not of obvious thing is also that like, you know, not, not cuz they're bad, but in fact just because they're normal, like Sweden is full of racism. Like there's lots of racism there, <laugh>, um, just like there is in the United States or France or Germany or wherever. Um, but there is a sort of mythology, a self-understanding of being this, you know, a nice country that, you know, one of the good guys, uh, welcoming, you know, open that, um, it's, it's difficult to even move the agenda, have the conversation.
Speaker 2 00:52:30 Um, those are the things that are, that are, that weigh on my mind about being worried about, uh, the party and the movement being able to rise to the, the current occasion. Like I I, if a racist party is gone in a decade, you know, from being nothing to the second largest party in the country, like the, the opposition to it has to be clear and vociferous and really different. And I'm n there's actually been some, some things said by the party leader just in the last few days that give me a lot of anxiety and concern, uh, that that's gonna happen.
Speaker 1 00:53:06 What would be that an example of that?
Speaker 2 00:53:09 Well, so the, the new government, the Swedish government, uh, backed by the Sweden Democrats came out with a, you know, basically a manifesto like here, it's a collection of parties. So they had to negotiate together to be like, this is gonna be our agenda for government. And the part of it that's, parts of it, it, that are about, excuse me, that are about immigration migration, um, that are about integration segregation question. Like, okay, people that are different, all live together. And then crime and crime prevention,
Speaker 2 00:53:42 Uh, it's a, it, it's a racist document. I mean, it's, it's an incredibly reactionary and dangerous set of policies that is just really explicitly saying that Sweden is better off without non Swedes, and we should limit them. We should, um, over police them. We should harass them. They're a problem, us and them, blah, blah, blah. I mean, it's, it's really a remarkably, uh, retrograde thing, like policy statement to see from a western European country in 2022. Wow. It's embarrassing for the country. And, you know, the, the leader of the left party came out and said, this is a tr fucking travesty. This is absurd. And the leader of the Green Party came out and said, this is awful and racist. And the leader of the center party, the outgoing leader of the center party, which is traditionally, this is traditionally a right wing party, um, came out of the agrarian, like the farmer's movement, um, but has a leader who's been, you know, just really, I have to say, remarkably solid and, and vocal about, uh, certain aspects of racism, calling it out.
Speaker 2 00:54:57 Um, you know, she, you know, she was like, this is, this is terrible. So like all of the parties that we would've been in government with that are, our friends have all said this. And the leader of the social democratic party said, well, the, the parts about migration and crime, those are like not controversial anymore. Those are, that's like status quo. And, and in fact, like we, we were there first and like already we're talking about those things. So, so think about that. Like, it's not in, we're not in the election season. It's not a time where it's like, oh, we gotta shore up our skittish white voters and so forth. This is like the beginning of the new era. We are in opposition. There's a, a, a party that comes from Nazis, uh, creating policy for Sweden, and the social democratic response was tepid, uh, no uhhuh, <affirmative>, I mean, supportive. It was terrible. Um, so that's a problem. Now, I don't think that that's, that reflects where most of the members are at. I don't think that even reflects probably where most of the members of the Parliament are at. Um, it's where the labor movement and as a whole, but then that needs to be shown, like there needs to be a fight about it, <laugh>, there needs to be work done about it.
Speaker 1 00:56:12 So the, the, the parts of the electorate or the parts of the population that come from the immigration, uh, from immigration, I assume they're underrepresented as voters. They're not, they're not.
Speaker 2 00:56:27 Correct.
Speaker 1 00:56:27 Yes. Correct. And, and is there any leadership in those communities that are, that are engaged electorally? Uh,
Speaker 2 00:56:35 Yes, of course. And of course, and also as I said, in, um, in all of the Nordic countries, those communities have been overwhelmingly supportive of parties of the left, right? Um, and their biggest, the biggest party among in those communities has been the social Democrats.
Speaker 2 00:56:56 Um, but it's been really clear that over the last several years, like since 2015, so since the, the turn by the party sort of more harshly, uh, against migration against people being able to reunify their families, and then just generally rhetorically kind of playing into this connection that the right wing makes between immigration, diversity, et cetera, and crime or insecurity, people have been way more agnostic about voting social democrat or just plainly hostile, devoting social democrat than, you know, ever before. So this was the, the other, the other big takeaway from the election and the results is that turnout in minority communities is the term I'm gonna use. Just be clear, cuz it's like some people are immigrants, a lot of them were born in Sweden. Um, so, uh, you know, it's not their immigration status or their, their proximity to immigration. That really is the factor if you were born in a place and still, you know, treated like a second class citizen.
Speaker 2 00:58:07 Anyway, the, the like turnout went down, um, overall and the share of the vote for social Democrats went down and a new party emerged for the first time, um, uh, you know, didn't win any seats nationally or come, come close, but made a showing in several, uh, cities, um, at the local level, A party that is like a coalition of minority community groups and leaders that have come together and are like highlighting issues of racism, discrimination. But also to give you a sense of like what, it's still fairly incoherent, you know, it's also like one of their main bullet points is ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine mm-hmm. <affirmative>, which is, you know, fine, that's great. But it's that, that's a kind of populism going on in itself, um, given the, the sort of like attitudes of, of the, uh, of minority groups of who they are, uh, geopolitically and culturally in Sweden.
Speaker 2 00:59:05 Anyway, point being, there's this other problem. So as the social Democrats have been, we've gotta move to the right on crime, we've gotta move to the right on migration. We've gotta like talk super tough to keep these traditional voters, uh, in the country, you know, uh, on side th they have lost ground in another very important part of their base. And the, just like the Democrats in the United States who have done the same thing and worried about, you know, this group of white suburban voters, that group of white word in class voters, et cetera, when, you know, as we all know, uh, Hillary Clinton would be president if, uh, you know, she'd matched the turnout and vote in, in the cities, in the black communities, in, in exactly some of those states that she famously lost to Trump. Like point being, there's more than one path to getting your strength back. Um, probably you want to do a little bit of expansion into both, but right now they seem to be dedicated to sort of shoring up one side by punching down on the other side. And that is a not a long-term strategy for left hegemony, let's say.
Speaker 1 01:00:26 So, so DRaaS, so one of the themes of our first season of this podcast, talking about the Democratic party in this country was the key. One of the keys to its transformation is grassroots organizing, uh, in, in every kind of community, building up the party organization, um, from the ground up. And I wonder if that has any relevance to, to the Swedish situation?
Speaker 2 01:00:57 I, I think it has all of the relevance <laugh> in a sense. Um, you know, the, the good news is that there are institutions and pots of resources and, uh, skilled people in a network of movement organizations and party organizations in Sweden that are, I, I have nothing but respect and awe and envy of, from an American standpoint, um, in terms of mechanisms that have been built over a century that allow regular people to exercise power. Mm-hmm. <affirmative>. Um, and, and even the party itself is really, like, one of the challenges is that, you know, they just, they're built around having tons and tons and tons of meetings is it was like always my beir as a, as a consultant. And, and look, the, the nice thing about that is that, yeah, they've created a, a structure in a political culture where like the idea is they win elections and then they still have meetings and discussion and engagement about what they should do with the power they win from elections.
Speaker 2 01:02:02 And like, that's what's totally missing in American politics. Yeah. I mean, when as an organized Democrat do you get a chance to actually like go and influence what the Democrats do in office, um, you have to like, create those out of whole cloth there in Sweden, they're there, so that's great. Now the challenge is reforming them, uh, reinvigorating them and moving them to a, to the spaces where people of color, other marginalized people can also use those mechanisms and, and those tools mm-hmm. <affirmative>. Um, and that's obviously easier said than done, but, but the lack of it is really reflected in the policy and the leadership that you see in the party. Um, the crime issue being really the, the, the one that was the most shocking or sort of, uh, yeah, difficult for me in some ways. Um, you know, the Sweden has been having a, a, a rash of, I don't know what to call it, what, um, sort of buzzword to use, but there has been a, a, a really shocking increase in murderous violence driven by gang competition and gang, uh, uh, turf wars and so forth.
Speaker 2 01:03:16 Mm-hmm. <affirmative>, um, in several of the, the cities of Sweden. Um, and, uh, just dozens of murders of the vast majority of which haven't been solved. Um, and typically, uh, just like here, right, the victims, the people that have to worry about this crime from a safety standpoint are, are poor and working people, uh, of color and minority groups and as well as, you know, white, Swedish working class people who live in these suburban enclaves. Um, and then the response has been more policing and now, and a competition between the parties about like who will put even more police in, um, you know, tough, tougher sentencing laws. There's already, from what I could see, little to no protections for people against racial profiling and harassment by the police. I saw it all the time and pretty much every young person I talked to in those communities talked about it.
Speaker 2 01:04:18 Um, and everyone was just like, pile on more and more power for the police, more police, et cetera, when the policing itself isn't working. And so, and this crime and its relationship to relationship to the drug trade is racialized in exactly the same ways that it has been in the United States. Um, and so it was like watching the Democrats in the nineties do all these things to like, seem more tough on crime. That ended up not really solving the problem and making life harder and more difficult for people in the, you know, in our case, in the inner cities. Um, it just was, you know, watching them do really the same thing and kind of fast and fast forward, like, and, um, we're still in the United States, like if there's one lesson that I do hope they take from America and from our experience is like, don't do that <laugh>, don't do the drug war.
Speaker 2 01:05:15 Don't do, uh, don't try to do social policy with cops. Um, look at, at civil rights and look at the, the what the policing means, and don't stifle debate or criticism that comes from within your movement, from people who have a different experience than the leaders. So like, we are still digging our way out of that in city after city in the United States. Um, and it has sacrificed millions of, you know, lives and, uh, you know, possibilities for human growth. For just so many youth of color, people of color in this country. Um, you know, you, you've gotta be better than that, Sweden. I mean, that, that's the point, is you, you gotta do better.
Speaker 1 01:06:11 Are there positive signs you, you, you've been seeing of a new generation of younger people of color as well as, you know, across the board who are ready for, um, the, the kind of turn toward the grassroots and toward building up new leadership, um, and representation from those communities within the, within the, uh, political, within the party sphere. Does that make any sense what I'm asking? Do you see any of that? It
Speaker 2 01:06:40 Does, yeah.
Speaker 1 01:06:40 Yeah.
Speaker 2 01:06:43 Um, and yes and no. I'd say, I mean, I think, uh, there, yeah, there definitely are lots of really wonderful people of all racial backgrounds, ethnic backgrounds that I met that like, get this stuff are concerned about it, have good, you know, skills and, and energy to try to make things better. I think that they're, they're sort of up, uh, it's an uphill battle in within the party and within the labor movement right now. Um, that could change. Um,
Speaker 2 01:07:12 And it could change quickly. I mean, one thing that I always sort of joke about with my friends there is like, Sweden can be really stubborn in a sense as a culture, as a, and like Swedish institutions and the state. Um, but like, once it makes a decision or a change, it's, everyone does it all at once. You know, it's, it's very quick. So, so it could be that there's a, there's a a, a sort of change in the wins. It's kind of as like always possible. Um, but right now it's, it, it is, it's a, it's an uphill battle as far as I could see. Um, the, the,
Speaker 2 01:07:49 But outside of the party and in civil society, there certainly is a lot just culturally a real flourishing as, as you'd expect. There's a, you know, people are living their lives and creating new culture. Um, they're expressing themselves through music and, uh, you know, dance and, you know, our urban culture of, of the kind that we see young people using all over the world now, bringing that together into a kind of new generation in electoral politics, that's harder, more difficult. I, I, I wouldn't, yeah, it's yet to be seen. One very strange thing that's happening in Sweden too that I don't know, I don't get, um, is that young people there, and, and I would assume that this is younger, young ethnic Swedes white folks, um, and I know that it is very gendered, but like young people are trending to the right that Sweden Democrats are kicking ass among young voters, for example. So like the opposite trends where here, uh, you know, pop culture and culture, youth culture is so progressive and only moving more progressive, um, in Sweden, that's not happening. And if anything, it's going in the other direction. Um, and that's strange and alarming and another thing that the movement needs to get its head around.
Speaker 1 01:09:18 Well, we've reached probably a, a good time to, uh, begin to wrap up this particular conversation, uh, which is to, to my mind very meaty, uh, much food for thought is what I mean by meaty. Um, and we didn't touch about the rest of Europe. Um, one thing I was gonna ask, my understanding about the left in Italy at this point, they have done urban, you know, organization within cities, new coalition kind of politics that wasn't really reflected in, in the national political behavior. But, um, I, I, I wonder if that is a clue to the, a potentially positive future, uh, it, because I've also read some comment by people in, on the left in, in, in England, uh, that I respect along the same lines building, uh, you know, which is very much what happened after the sixties in this country is trying to go back to the community level and build from the ground up, which I think we've had, it's a long history now of 50 years, but, uh, I take pride in what we were able to accomplish that way, still not reversing the frightening <laugh>, the frightening future that seems to be impending for some in so many ways.
Speaker 1 01:10:43 But I wonder whe whether, uh, um, you wanna make any further comment, uh, before we close around, any of that?
Speaker 2 01:10:51 Yeah, well just,
Speaker 2 01:10:54 I mean, mostly I see that as the overall split that's happening around the world, between cities and, uh, rural areas mm-hmm. <affirmative> and, and between bigger cities and small cities, and between, um, you know, well networked, whether it's, you know, coast or highland or north versus south, but like, well networked areas versus more, um, sort of socially isolated, uh, small community, small network places. So the, it, it's true that in Italy right now, the strength of the left is in like, coalitions of group of small parties or groups of active citizens, uh, you know, and, and then parts of the national parties at the municipal level, but it's more like the Italian left used to also run those. So yeah, a lot of those. So it, it's more like a retreat to the cities in a sense. And that's what also the thing that's happening in, in Sweden, in Denmark, um, in Norway, uh, we're about to see it.
Speaker 2 01:12:00 I think they're having regional elections, regional and local elections next year. I think we're gonna see that i, I, I assume are from looking at election maps in Britain, though I know that place, you know, less than others, the, that like, we're, we're just like losing the countryside and, and gaining in the cities and, and managing the cities is a tr you know, is like awesome and gives us, and there's lots of really interesting opportunities around transit and housing and so forth, but like, we're not doing that well on any of those things. Um, you know, the, the left has governed Paris for a long time. I, I really, I'm a fan of the mayor there. She's tried to do a lot to alleviate the housing crisis, but at the end of the day, like cities need national resources, right? To do those sorts of things. Yes, absolutely. They have to break internal coalitions of NIMBYs and so forth. So it's not as if we've figured the cities out, but it is true that that's the only place we're consistently winning. Mm-hmm. <affirmative>. And by we, I mean the left generally. Um, so we've gotta get better at it and then figured out how to parlay, you know, stronger, bigger turnout elections in cities into national power. And that's where just in country after country, we're not able to do
Speaker 1 01:13:13 Well, to be continued indeed, uh, indeed between the two of us and be and for the rest of humanity as well. We hope we <laugh>, we hope humanity will go forward from
Speaker 2 01:13:24 Here. Yes, in Shallah,
Speaker 1 01:13:26 There's more to come on, uh, on this podcast and as in weeks to come, and we hope that people will, uh, tell others. If you find these conversations rewarding, uh, about it, uh, go to our, uh, website on patreon.com, tsm h slash tsm, h patreon.com, tsm h and maybe subscribe. Help us out in that way. Uh, and, uh, comments is what we really miss. We'd love to hear from people. What would you like to see us talk about? What are your thoughts, what suggestions for, uh, reading and, and, and further expanding people's awareness? You have. We hope to hear from you. Uh, and thanks for being here with us now.
Speaker 2 01:14:19 Thanks a lot.